



INFORMATIONS PRATIQUES

FORMAT
Face to face

MODE DE PARTICIPATION

DATE
**Paris, September 1 and
2, 2017**

LIEU

PARTICIPATION
€0

INSCRIPTION
www.aefr.eu

CONTACT
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Conference

Public Authority and Finance: What is the Relevant Scale and Scope of Deregulation and Re-Regulation?

Logo Labex

CALL FOR PAPERS

(PDF)

The Laboratory of Excellence on Financial Regulation is pleased to announce a call for papers for its International Conference on Public Authority and Finance, to be held in Paris on September 1 and 2, 2017. This conference is being organised by: Labex ReFI (Paris). It is partnered by the **Centre on Corporate Governance, Columbia Law School** (New York), the Blavatnik School of Government, **University of Oxford**, **DIW** (Berlin), **Policy Network** (London), and the **Université Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris 3** (CERVEPAs, Paris).

In partnership with

Public Authority and Finance:

What is the Relevant Scale and Scope of Deregulation and Re-Regulation?

Paris, September 1 and 2, 2017

Deadlines – save the date:

Abstract submission by **February 15, 2017**

Full paper by **July 15, 2017**

PRESENTATION

This conference seeks to contribute to the ongoing research into financial regulation, combining approaches by economists, legal experts, political scientists, geographers and historians. It aims to adopt an empirical approach from a comparative and historical perspective to characterize public authority and its relationship to the financial sector.

We invite papers from different disciplines to examine three main areas, to understand better the various aspects of the relationship between public authority and finance today:

1. Ideology, Technology and Regulatory Effectiveness

This area covers the ideological justifications of deregulation (public choice, corruption and political distortions), and the technological developments permitting rules to be circumvented: well before “fintech” became fashionable, alternative exchange platforms had undermined market regulation and given rise to high frequency trading. Now, unregulated crypto-currencies evade money laundering regulations, etc. Precise timelines of the relations between these technological (or ideological) changes and their legal consequences (like the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act) are required. More generally, it may be asked on what political-theoretical grounds public authority should act today?

2. The Role of New Regulatory Players and the New Frontiers of Public Authority

Case studies could analyze the recent history, showing for instance how the traditional public authorities handed over their regulatory powers to new independent entities, either private (such as FINRA and PCAOB) or public (as it is mainly the case in continental Europe, such as the European Supervisory Authorities), be they national or international. Forward looking contributions, for instance on the possible form and impact of the global financial registry suggested by Thomas Piketty, or indeed on the possible deregulation by the Trump administration, are appreciated. More theoretical contributions could address general questions such as the legitimacy (collective and/or individual) of such authorities. Under what principles do they operate? What kind of financial activities (especially the diverse shadow banking sector) should be optimally covered by different kinds of authorities? Will they be able to adapt to further financial innovation? How can the capture of public authorities be better dealt with?

3. Changes in the (Territorial) Scope of Financial Regulation

Do financial markets working in parallel reflect a multi-polar world or a continuum? What areas of homogeneity can be identified? What is the present situation, and what is desirable? What, for example, would be the effects of a global financial registry on tax evasion of financial wealth-related inequalities? Do we need global regulators or supervisors for financial institutions (such as banks) in order to prevent the capture or leniency of national authorities? Or is a global framework with national implementation (as initiated by the Financial Stability Board, FSB) enough to prevent systemic risk? Only the United States seems to have shown its authority over international banks by clearly fining them for misconduct. So what are the theoretical foundations for having authorities encompassing multiple jurisdictions? Does such an authority need to be the universal expression of one state or an effective public authority reflecting true multilateral commitments? Alternative constructions of finance may be examined within this framework: for instance, does Islamic finance offer a consistent international rule of law, or is it an expression of local idiosyncrasies?

SELECTION PROCESS AND DEADLINES:

Communication proposals (maximum 400 words) and **short biographies** should be sent to Nicholas Sowels <Nicholas.Sowels@univ-paris1.fr>, by **February 15, 2017**.

Speakers will receive **notification by March 15, 2017**, and will be requested to **submit their papers by July 15, 2017**.

Financial support for travel will be provided, as far as possible, to PhD

students and postdoctoral researchers. Confirmation of support will be given with the acceptance of papers.

For further information, please contact Pierre-Charles Pradier <Pierre-Charles.Pradier@univ-paris1.fr> or Nicholas Sowels <Nicholas.Sowels@univ-paris1.fr>.

SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE:

Members of the Scientific Committee include:

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