The Financial Self-Regulation Limits

Bernard COUPEZ * Professeur associé en sciences économiques, Centre de recherches en économie et droit, Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas ; membre du Collège, Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF). Contact : bernard.coupez@u-paris2.fr.L'auteur remercie Bruno Deffains pour ses remarques et suggestions qui lui ont permis d'améliorer une version antérieure de cet article. Les erreurs et les omissions relèvent, toutefois, de la seule responsabilité de l'auteur.

We seek to demonstrate, by examining two recent cases why self-regulation generates
limits that lead some concerned players in finance to wish the passage of the
self-regulation to the regulation, accompanied by a supervision off the players and a device
of potential sanctions.
The first case is that of credit rating, where the self-regulation existing before the collapse
of Lehman Brothers clearly showed its limits and where a European and transatlantic
regulation was imposed, including a supervision for players.
The second case is more recent and evolving since it is the Initial Coin Offerings, where
self-regulation currently prevails but where the debate on the passage from self-regulation
to a Regulatory form is currently intense not only among players but within regulators.