Heterogeneous Accountability Settings for Eurosystem Central Banks

According to the principles of modern central bank governance, accountability is the necessary complement of independence. The empirical literature on central bank governance has produced some indices of central bank accountability, but on a much smaller scale than those for central bank independence. Empirical research on the accountability of central banks in the Eurosystem is particularly lacking in a post global financial crisis world that witnessed an extension of central banks' sphere of activity. Recent empirical research has focused on European Central Bank practices. National central banks have not received much attention, although they continue to play an important role. In order to shed light on the blind spots of the accountability of Eurosystem central banks, this paper offers an updated index of accountability and compares the accountability settings of national central banks. Despite homogeneity in the overall level of accountability, national central banks have very heterogeneous procedures when it comes to reporting to political authorities. Different relationships between independence and accountability are discussed, as well as the potential impact of recent evolutions of central banking on trust in central banks, particularly through the lens of the French institutionalist theories of money.